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INTRODUCTION
Few things in society and everyday life have
changed in the last 10 years as much as the
concept of security. From bank robberies
to wars, what used to imply a great deal of
violence is now silently happening on the
Internet. Perhaps more strikingly, the very
idea of privacy – a concept closely related
to that of individual freedom – is undergo-
ing such a profound revolution that people
are suddenly unable to make rational and
informed decisions: we protested for the
introduction of RFID tags (Kelly and Erick-
son, 2005; Lee and Kim, 2006) and now
we throw away en-masse most of our pri-
vate information by subscribing to services
(social media, free apps, cloud services),
which have their reason of existence in the
commerce of intimate personal data.
The ICT revolution has changed the
game, and the security paradigms that were
suitable for people and systems just up
to 10 years ago are now obsolete. It looks
like we do not know what to replace them
with. As of today, we keep patching systems
but we do not understand how to make
them reasonably secure (Rice, 2007); per-
haps more importantly, we do not under-
stand what reasonable privacy guarantees
are for human beings, let alone how to
enforce them. We do not understand how
to combine accountability and freedom in
this new world, in which firewalls and dig-
ital perimeters cannot guarantee security
and privacy any longer.
We believe that the root of the challenge
that we face is understanding security and
how information technology can enable
and support such an understanding.
And just like security is a broad, mul-
tidisciplinary topic covering technical as
well as non-technical issues, the chal-
lenge of understanding security is a mul-
tifaceted one, spanning across a myriad
of noteworthy topics. Here, we mention
just three that we consider particularly
important.
UNDERSTANDING WHAT HAPPENS IN
SYSTEMS (MONITORABILITY)
Our software is buggy, leaving the door
open to cyberthreats. From what we see,
we believe it will stay so for many years,
leaving us in the hands of security technol-
ogy, which is clearly not able to cope with
the complexity of today’s attacks. Advanced
malware, advanced persistent threats, and
alike are evading present countermeasures
(mainly based on blacklisting) with dis-
couraging ease. We still defend cyberassets
using preventive measures such as access-
control, firewalls, DMZs, and alike. These
measures, however, are no match for a well-
done targeted attack. The challenge is to
discover the attack as soon as possible, and
to limit the damages that it can do. Know-
ing that no blacklisting systems will recog-
nize them, one is left with the task of detect-
ing them as an anomaly in the normal sys-
tem behavior. We are starting to see the first
successes, based on, for instance, emulation
(Lanzi et al., 2010). However, with hosts
running hundreds of processes, internal
networks producing gigabytes of traffic per
hour, and log files that are megabytes long,
finding the right anomaly is really like find-
ing the proverbial needle in the haystack.
Therefore, having given up the illusion that
software will ever be completely bug-free,
we believe that in the future, we will have
software that is monitorable by design, soft-
ware that facilitates the work of the security
officers in detecting and reacting timely to
threats.
UNDERSTANDING HOW TO BALANCE
PRIVACY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
The last years have seen an increase in the
tension between privacy and accountability
(Anderson, 2014). We have witnessed (and
accepted) a dramatic increase in online
monitoring and surveillance. The NSA rev-
elations (The Guardian, 2014) look almost
like a logical consequence of this. The time
when the Internet was meant to be “com-
pletely free” seems long gone, and while it
is unacceptable for the Internet to be a free
playground for criminals, creating a sur-
veillance state will not solve the problem,
but is creating a different – possibly larger –
problem instead (Kehl et al., 2014). This is
by no means a purely regulatory problem:
it raises very hard technical challenges. In
particular: how to make people account-
able for their actions without putting at
risk their privacy is a tremendously diffi-
cult technical problem, a problem that we
are obligated to solve. The challenge is to
allow people and institutions to keep con-
trol on their data, even when the data have
left the premises of the personal computer,
allowing people to mitigate mistakes while
keeping them accountable when they cross
the line. We have witnessed some impor-
tant steps in this direction, particularly in
the area of cloud computing (e.g., Takabi
et al., 2010; Ko et al., 2011; Guagnin et al.,
2012), but we believe that there is still a long
way to go.
UNDERSTANDING THE VALUE OF SECURITY
Security has costs for people and organiza-
tions alike. Securing systems and data takes
time, resources, money, and makes systems
less usable. Today, IT-risk management is
an art, not a science. Even companies with
well-developed security systems are not
able to properly “quantify” the costs and
benefits of security and nor are they fully
aware of the real consequences of secu-
rity incidents. Risk-assessment standards
(e.g., ISO/IEC 27001, NIST SP 800-30)
give us very little support in understanding
the trade-offs between benefits and often
hidden costs. When we shift the focus from
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organizations to people, this issue becomes
even more pressing: people do not have the
means to understand how much (the lack
of) privacy and security could cost them.
We do not know how much are we actu-
ally sacrificing in the name of functionality,
services, usability, and lower direct costs.
Strikingly, the – dual – value of insecu-
rity is an area in which a lot of progress
has been made recently. This relates to the
offensive side of cybersecurity, where soft-
ware vulnerabilities have now their own
market, and a precise price list (Schneier,
2013a,b). The challenge for us remains to
be able to quantify what is the value of
cybersecurity ; in particular, the challenge is
to develop novel IT-risk assessment meth-
ods to support a person (or a company)
in making decisions regarding the secu-
rity and privacy measures to be taken. The
research community is becoming aware of
the urgency of such methods, and we can
now find forums like Workshop on the Eco-
nomics of Information Security (WEIS),
that aim to bring together researchers and
practitioners in order to advance the states
of the art and practice in the evaluation of
security.
Bringing our IT infrastructure to a
reasonable security level is a tremendous
challenge that we are facing now. It is
a technological challenge with an impor-
tant multidisciplinary component, touch-
ing economical, sociological, psycholog-
ical, and regulatory issues. To tackle it
properly, we will have to rethink some
of the basic assumptions in computer
security and solve a number of compro-
mises, often spanning across more than one
discipline.
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